Understanding the logic of forensic identification decisions
(without numbers)
Alex Biedermann / Joëlle Vuille *
Over the past few years, a movement has been initiated among
forensic science researchers and practitioners, in Switzerland and
across Western criminal justice systems more generally, to shift
away from categorical assertions of common source (e.g., «this
crime scene mark and this control print come from the same
person») towards new reporting formats that consider expert
conclusions as decisions (e.g., an «identification» or
«exclusion» is a decision made by the forensic examiner).
As this movement gains momentum, there remains disagreement on how
exactly the notion of decision ought to be understood. The call for
improvement of the understanding of the logical tenets of forensic
identification decisions faces the obstacle that many forensic
practitioners shy away from formal and quantitative approaches
(e.g., decision theory). The purpose of this contribution is to
show that the logical essentials of forensic identification
decisions can be captured and conveyed without going into the
details of the mathematics of decision theory. We will then present
and defend the view that forensic identification requires
assessments and value judgments that go beyond the forensic
practitioner's area of competence and that this fact requires a
reassessment of the distribution of responsibilities between
experts and other participants in the legal process.
Citation: Alex Biedermann/Joëlle Vuille, Understanding the logic
of forensic identification decisions (without numbers), in: sui-generis 2018, S. 397
URL: sui-generis.ch/83
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.21257/sg.83
* Alex Biedermann (alex.biedermann[at]unil.ch), PhD, Associate professor, University of Lausanne, School of Criminal Justice. Joëlle Vuille (joelle.vuille[at]unil.ch), PhD, Senior researcher, University of Lausanne, School of Criminal Justice. This research was supported by the Swiss National Science Foundation through Grant No. BSSGI0_155809. The authors would like to thank Simon Cole, Richard Friedman, Edward Imwinkelried and David Moran for their helpful comments on an earlier draft. Alex Biedermann gratefully acknowledges the support of the University of Michigan Law School (Michigan Grotius Research Fellowship). This paper was presented at the 18th Annual Meeting of the ENFSI Fingerprint Working Group, September 4th–7th 2018, University of Lausanne.
I. Introduction
After comparing a fingermark found on a crime scene with reference prints
taken from a suspect, many forensic examiners, in Switzerland, Europe and
beyond, will offer conclusions such as «Source identification (i.e.,
came from the same source)» or «Source exclusion (i.e., came from
different sources)». Such conclusions are common in many forensic
disciplines, including comparative handwriting examination, tool and shoe
mark analysis, etc. But they are most typically encountered - and expected
by recipients of expert information - in the area of fingerprint
comparisons.
A reported conclusion of the kind «the crime scene trace and the
reference mark came from the same source» (i.e., source
identification) may sound self-explanatory. The problem is that such a
statement is indefensible. The mere assertion by a forensic practitioner
that a mark and a reference print come from the same source does not imply
or prove that the source of the mark has been established. The reasons for
this are threefold: empirical, argumentative and regulatory. On an
empirical account, forensic practitioners usually do not conduct an
exhaustive comparison against all potential sources of a recovered
fingermark. A fingerprint examiner does not compare a mark found at a crime
scene with the reference prints from all conceivable donors of the mark, to
find all of them - except one - not to correspond.[1]
It does not mean either that the examiner has excluded all potential donors
from a certain suspect population. Most often, it is not even clear what
the population of potential sources is (size, composition, etc.).[2]
A further empirical consideration is that, both in real cases and in tests
under controlled conditions, examiners have been found to provide erroneous
conclusions. Thus, even if an exhaustive investigation of all potential
sources is feasible (closed-set situation), assertions of common source are
still not warranted, because of the potential of error.
On the argumentative side, an examiner's assertion that a mark and
a reference print «came from the same source» is merely an item
of information that is to be distinguished from the proposition (or,
hypothesis) that the mark and the reference print come from the same
source. Even if it is highly probable that an examiner will report that a
mark and a print «came from the same source» when that
proposition is actually true, this does not imply that the
proposition of common source is necessarily true. Claiming the contrary
would amount to committing the so-called inversion fallacy, by which a
deductive statement is wrongly transposed into an inductive statement.[3]
On a regulatory account, the profession itself cautions against the use of
identification conclusions.[4]
Recently, for example, directions were issued according to which examiners
shall «not assert that two friction ridge impressions originated from
the same source to the exclusion of all other sources», «not
assert that latent print examination is infallible or has a zero error
rate» and «not use assertions of reasonable certainty».[5]
This regulatory movement started in the United States approximately a
decade ago following the publication of a report by the National Research
Council.[6]
Debates around those questions have now also spread to Europe and, to a
limited extent, Switzerland. In Switzerland, there are currently no written
guidelines or standards mandating fingerprint examiners to adopt a given
format when reporting on their conclusions.[7]
From the above considerations, it follows that the conclusion «came
from the same source» (i.e., identification) does not imply
or establish that the suspect is indeed the source of the crime scene
trace. This is a problem as it makes conclusions difficult to understand
for the recipients of such expert testimony. In an effort to remedy those
shortcomings, forensic practitioners have initiated a shift away from
categorical assertions and towards new reporting formats centring on the
notion of «decision». According to this new perspective, a
«[source identification] conclusion is an examiner's decision that the
observed friction ridge skin features are in sufficient
correspondence».[8]
This suggests that source identification is achieved whenever the examiner decides so - leaving it unclear when exactly (i.e., under which
conditions) such a decision is warranted, and what it really means in the
context of the case at hand.
In a descriptive sense, the choice of the term decision for labelling
expert conclusions seems sensible since, indeed, examiners[9]
need to decide, at some point, what conclusion to render in any given case.
One could argue that this terminology has the advantage of making it clear
that a judgment on the part of the examiner is required, and that a
«match» is not the reflection of some incontrovertible ground
truth that the examiner has merely «discovered». In that
perspective, calling an identification a «decision» is an
improvement over earlier formulations in that it makes it explicit that a
(fallible) human evaluation is the basis for the expert conclusion provided
to the fact-finder.
But the notion of decision can also be approached in more formal terms, in
particular through decision theory. In its normative perspective, decision
theory defines optimal decisions to be made by an agent with rational
aspirations, on the basis of that agent's beliefs about uncertain states of
nature, and the agent's assessment of the relative desirability[10]
of the various consequences[11]
of each possible choice.[12]
According to Cole, however, forensic expert working groups do not
appear to approach decisions in the rigorous sense of decision theory.[13]
Informal conversations with practitioners suggest that the quantitative
nature of probabilities and utilities, and their coherent treatment
according to decision theory, are seen as hurdles that cannot be overcome
in this context. One of the aims of this contribution is to show that the
quantitative and computational aspects of classic decision theory are not
necessarily required for the logical thinking about decision problems, and
hence should not deter practitioners from considering formal approaches to
guide their evaluative reporting.
Besides, as it may be tempting to conclude that decision-theoretic
principles are practically irrelevant and can be dealt with dismissively,
we will explain why this attitude is short-sighted. Specifically, we will
present and defend the view that all forensic conclusions, most notably
identification decisions, have underlying logical tenets that can be
explained in basic decision-theoretic terms, without quantitative
assessments, and independently of whether or not reporting examiners
actively endorse and rely on decision-theoretic principles when they
evaluate the evidence in the case at hand. Our paper is structured as
follows. Section II will clarify the fundamental terms that all forensic
conclusions comprise. We will use standard decision-theoretic terms, but
unlike previous publications in this context, we will avoid formulae and
decision matrices, favouring verbal accounts of qualitative considerations
and graphical means. Based on these elements, Section III will critically
review and discuss current reporting conventions, showing that the
legitimacy of the stance taken by a majority of practitioners on the topic
of identification conclusions must be seriously questioned due to the
intricate issues and stakes involved in forensic identification practice.
II. Clarifying the logic of identification decisions without numbers
1. Decision trees: the anatomy of forensic identification decisions
The logic of forensic identification decisions can be represented in
graphical terms, such as decision trees. Consider Figure 1, which shows a
decision tree for a simplified forensic identification problem. It is
simplified because only two decisions are considered: identifying (d1) or not identifying the person of interest (d2) as the source of the crime scene mark, the latter
decision being a generic placeholder for all conclusions other than
«identification» (for example, «inconclusive»).[14]
Decision trees have two types of nodes. The first are decision nodes,
taking the form of squared boxes. Their emanating branches represent the
different possible decisions in the case at hand. These decisions are
mutually exclusive and exhaustive: only one of them can be taken, and one
of them must be taken. Circles are another type of nodes - so-called chance
nodes - whose emanating branches represent states of nature of the present,
past or future. These states of nature are mutually exclusive and
exhaustive.
When constructing decision trees, one usually starts on the left, by
defining the relevant decision point. In our example, the possible
decisions are represented by the branches «identifying the person of
interest» (d1), or «not identifying the
person of interest» (d2) as the source of the
crime scene mark. Moving on each of these two branches to the right leads
to chance nodes, representing the possible states of nature under which the
decisions are being made. Indeed, when deciding how to conclude, it is not
known which state of nature actually holds: i.e., it is not known whether
the person of interest or an unknown person is the source of the crime
scene mark. At the far right-hand side are decision outcomes, defined by
combinations of decisions and particular states of nature: e.g.,
identifying the person of interest d1 when in fact the
person of interest is the source of the crime scene mark represents a
correct identification, whereas a false identification occurs when the
expert identifies the person of interest as the source of the crime scene
mark when in fact an unknown person is the source of the mark. Similarly, a
false non-identification and correct non-identification occur from deciding d2 when in reality the person of interest and an
unknown person, respectively, is the source of the mark.

Figure 1:
Decision tree for a simplified forensic identification
problem. The squared node represents a decision point,
with two branches representing the two feasible
decisions «identify», d1,
and «do not identify» (the person of
interest), d2. The circled nodes
represent states of nature (in terms of the branches
emanating to the right), i.e. the person of interest
and an unknown person is the source of the trace,
respectively.
2. Thinking about possible decision outcomes
Figure 1 provides a descriptive summary of the basic elements of a generic
forensic identification problem. But there is more to decision problems
than decisions and states of nature. Indeed, when making a decision, it is
natural to pay attention to the relative desirability of various decision
consequences. Clearly, not all decision consequences are equally desirable:
accurate conclusions, i.e., correct identification and non-identification,
are preferred to wrong determinations, i.e., false identification and false
non-identification (i.e., a missed identification). For the purpose of the
current discussion, it is sufficient to express the relative desirability
of decision outcomes qualitatively: we use a checkmark in a white box for
accurate conclusions, and a cross for erroneous conclusions. The overall
worst conclusion, a false identification, is shown with a cross in a box
with a black background. Note that this is a particular assumption that
seems suitable for identification decisions at advanced stages in the
criminal process (e.g., at trial). Assessments may be different during the
investigative phase where a false non-identification may deprive
authorities from a relevant investigative lead. A false identification
during the investigation may be considered less adverse than a false
non-identification because it is expected other information accumulated in
the case will help uncover the false association.[15]
Figure 2 provides a summary of these considerations.

Figure 2:
Decision tree previously defined in Figure 1, extended
here - on the far right-hand side - with an indication
of the relative desirability of the various possible
decision outcomes. Checkmarks represent desirable
outcomes, and crosses indicate less desirable outcomes.
The overall worst consequence, a false identification,
is highlighted with a cross in a box with a black
background.
3. Thinking about how to decide
Forensic scientists commonly assert that when rendering identification
conclusions, they adequately take into account the fact that conclusions
may be erroneous and, hence, represent undesirable outcomes. But how
exactly can this be done? To examine this question, consider again Figure 2
and imagine a scientist who pursues a prudent approach. In particular,
assume that the scientist takes a pessimistic perspective, in the sense
that, whatever decision is made (i.e., «identifying», or
«not identifying»), the focus is on undesirable outcomes: a false
identification or a missed identification. Thus, if the scientist's
concerns are adverse decision outcomes, one possible strategy - known as
the minimax strategy - would be to always decidenot to identify the person of interest as the source of the mark (d2). This attitude would be meaningful in the sense that, even if the expert does not identify the person
of interest as the source of the mark when this person is in fact the
source of the mark (missed identification), this consequence is less adverse than committing a wrong identification (the adverse
consequence associated with d1).[16]
Indeed, the latter is the overall worst consequence (see Sect. 2.2). In
Figure 2, the branch corresponding to decision d2
(«do not identify»), the minimax decision, is highlighted in
bold, and the branch representing decision d1
(«identify») is double crossed.
However, always avoiding the overall worst consequence comes at the price
of never identifying anyone as the source of a crime scene trace. Clearly,
this would severely limit the interest that members of the judiciary may
have in the services of scientists who adopt this approach. Conversely, the
above discussion also makes it clear that any person who chooses to make
identification conclusions, hence all scientists who adhere to the
traditional identification practice, cannot do so without accepting the
possibility of identifying as the source of the trace a person who is in
fact not the source. This gives rise to the following two questions: First,
if identification decisions are necessary to the well-functioning of the legal process, and
thus must be made, what bases should be required before they can be made?
Second, should such decisions be made by forensic scientists, or by the
decision-maker? We will address these two questions in turn in the next
paragraph.

Figure 3:
Decision tree previously defined in Figure 1,
highlighting two essential decision ingredients (for
the situation in which decision d1,
«identify», is made): consideration of
the relative adversity of decision consequences, and
the probability of the relevant states of nature
(i.e., whether the person of interest or an unknown
person is the source of the crime scene mark). The
dotted lines of the branches indicate that there is
uncertainty about which state of nature holds, and
hence which decision consequence is obtained.
4. Assessing the suitability of identification decisions
As we have seen, decision-makers who identify the person of interest as the
source of a crime scene mark must take into consideration the possibility
of making a false identification. The natural follow-up question to this
is: How small should the probability of an erroneous determination be in
order for the identification decision d1 to be
acceptable? And, related to this question, how probable must a correct
identification be at a minimum before an identification conclusion
is acceptable? It is important to emphasise at this point that the
probabilities for the various decision consequences - and hence the answers
to these questions - correspond to the decision-maker's probabilities for
the two possible states of nature that condition the consequences.[17]
Figure 3 summarises the two main decision ingredients discussed so far: the
relative adversity of decision consequences and the probability (as
assessed by the decision-maker) of each consequence.
This captures many experts' natural way of thinking about forensic
identification problems: indeed, it is often argued that, the more an
expert regards a false identification as an undesirable consequence, the
higher her requirements will be for the probability that the trace comes
from the person of interest before she is willing to identify.[18]
Stated otherwise, in order to feel 'comfortable' with making the
identification decision, decision-makers seek to ensure, as best
as possible, that the person of interest is indeed the source of the crime
scene mark, rather than an unknown person.
Although straightforward at first sight, decision theory supports this
argument in two distinctive and important ways. First, decision theory
specifies how assessments of the desirability of decision consequences are
to be coherently combined with probabilities for unknown states of nature.
Specifically, decision theory says that the losses (or, utilities) assessed
for all possible consequences of a decision are to be weighted by the
respective probabilities with which the various consequences are thought to
occur, leading to the notion of expected loss (or, utility). This result, expected loss (or, utility), provides a
basis for comparing the relative merits of rival decisions. This, in turn,
may help the decision-maker choose between various decision options.[19]
Second, such computations also allow one to sort out exact decision points:
for example, given an assessment of the relative desirability of the
decision consequences, decision theory defines the limiting probabilities
for the states of nature such that one decision becomes preferable to a
given rival decision.[20]
This also allows one to give statements of the following kind: «When
one's probability for the person of interest being the source of the crime
scene mark is x times greater than the probability that an unknown
person is the source, the decision to identify is warranted only if a false
identification of the person of interest is considered less than x times worse than a missed identification».[21]
Again, the quantitative investigation of these results is beyond the scope
of this contribution; of main interest here are the more general,
qualitative orders of magnitude for the assessment of the key factors, as
well as the insight that, in order to be coherent, these assessments ought
to still comply with the underlying logical constraints. An example for
this is the precept mentioned above that one's probability for the person
of interest being the source of the crime scene mark ought to be higher the more adverse a false identification is
considered to be compared to a missed identification. Also of interest is
the question of what implications for forensic reporting practice these
qualitative understandings have. We will address these aspects in Section
III.
III. Discussion
1. Decision competence and decision prerogatives
As argued throughout Section II, forensic identification involves intricate
issues that raise the question of whether it is appropriate for forensic
examiners to render identification decisions. Specifically, the question is
whether forensic examiners should take a stance with respect to (i) the
probabilities as to whether the person of interest or an unknown person is
the source of the crime scene mark, and (ii) the relative desirability of
the various decision consequences.
Let us consider aspect (i) first: What does the forensic scientist really know when it comes to judging whether the person of
interest is the source of the crime scene mark? The answer is «most
often, not much», essentially because the forensic scientist does not
have access to the entirety of the case brought against the defendant.
Besides, there is a misconception about the scientist's role - aspect (ii).
A blunt way to state it is as follows: Why would scientists think they have
any competence in assessing how adverse it would be for this defendant to be wrongly associated with the crime scene
mark, i.e. suffering the consequences of an erroneous determination made by
the examiner? Conversely, why would scientists think they have the
competence to assess how adverse it would be for society in this
particular case to miss a correct identification? More generally, the
question we face is: Do we want examiners to make assessments as to the
relative adversity of their erroneous determinations, in particular false
identifications, decisions from which they do not suffer
themselves the most if they make a mistake?[22]
Clearly, these are fundamental questions that cannot be answered from the
scientists' perspective alone. These questions touch upon the broader
topics of decision competence and decision prerogatives, tightly connected
to the rights and duties of the parties at trial, and the broader values at
stake in the criminal justice process.
It is true that none of the essential decision ingredients exposed in
Section II.3 are original. Indeed, it is a well-known precept that one
ought to be concerned about the relative adversity of decision consequences
and the probability of their occurrence. And yet, although the fundamental
decision ingredients are well known, examiners do not cope with them
explicitly. It is a well-established principle that experts should not
explicitly opine as to questions of law. There is no reason why they should
be allowed to do so implicitly either. The fact-finder and the parties do
not receive answers from experts to questions such as how adverse a false
identification should be judged, and what the threshold probability
necessary to identify should be in any individual case. No scientist can
answer these questions, yet scientists identify every day (i.e.,
render identification decisions).
It can be useful to look at the intricacy of identification decisions from
the viewpoint of more general, overarching legal concepts, such as
deference.[23]
This concept provides a good descriptive account of widespread current
identification practice. Indeed, whenever recipients of expert information
invite scientists to directly answer questions such as «is the person
of interest the source of the crime scene mark?», they defer
conclusions of common source to scientists.
Pairing the deferential account of expert witness testimony in the context
of forensic identification with the insight provided by the decisional
account outlined throughout Section II further clarifies what exactly
happens in current reporting practice: not only is the identification
decision deferred to the scientist, but so are crucial decision ingredients
(i.e., value judgments and probabilities). Scientists may be aware of this
decisional burden and at least tacitly assess the inevitable decision
ingredients. But since this does not currently take place transparently,
and the court is not told about the assumptions being made by scientists,
they will impose their assessments onto the court. Worse than this lack of
transparency are those situations in which the scientist is not aware of what it really means to identify, and the court is
left uninformed about the logical underpinnings of identification
decisions. In the latter case, the process will operate without safeguards
against flawed modes of reasoning, as for both the expert and the
recipients of expert information it remains unclear what exactly is
logically and conceptually at stake with identification conclusions.
What emerges from this cross-perspective between the deferential account of
forensic evidence and forensic decisionalism, is not a solution, but an
original way to look at the problem of identification. Apart from providing
arguments against deference, the decisional account can help fact-finders
and parties better understand that forensic identification requires
assessments that intimately relate to the personal situation of the
defendant and, thus, that it may be in the interest of the fact-finders and
parties to take a close look at how those assessments are actually made.
The decisional account thus helps to empower the fact-finders and the
parties, by encouraging them to adopt a more active role in the legal
process when experts are called to testify. Defence lawyers, especially,
may wish to keep control over the assessment of factors relevant to their
clients' situation.
Our analysis thus far does not answer the question of who should conclude
or decide on the identification (or otherwise) of the person of interest,
but it shows that identification goes beyond purely scientific
considerations. These wider considerations depend on the internal structure
and policy choices of the respective legal order.[24]
2. Confronting different reporting formats
The attentive reader will have noticed that, throughout the analyses and
discussion presented so far in this paper, the focus was on questions
regarding facts:
Who is the source of the crime scene mark?
Let us call this the traditional identification paradigm. It differs from
questions of the following kind, called here the evaluative account of
forensic reporting[25]:
What is the (probative) value of the similarities and differences
observed between the crime scene mark and the reference material taken
from the person of interest?
and
For which (if any) of the two competing propositions do the
observations provide support? - Do the observations support the
proposition that the person of interest is the source of the crime
scene mark, or the proposition that an unknown person is the source of
the mark?
Let us illustrate the above two perspectives in further detail. Consider a
comparison between a fingermark found on a crime scene and a reference
fingerprint taken from a suspect. After analyzing the mark and comparing it
to the print, the analyst will give consideration to the entirety of the
observations, i.e. both similarities and discrepancies. Analysts who adhere
to the evaluative account will focus their attention on the
assignment of a probability for observing the similarities and
discrepancies under the assumption that the person of interest is the
source of the crime scene mark. Similarly, they will also assess the
probability of making the observations given the assumption that someone
else than the person of interest is the source of the crime scene mark.
Such evaluations are based on the expert's knowledge, ideally informed by
structured data published in the scientific literature. Personal experience
in the form of comparisons performed on specimens known to come from the
same and different sources, respectively, may also be invoked provided that
the relevant work experience has been documented and can be disclosed for
review and inspection.[26]
The result of these considerations is a ratio of probabilities, commonly
known as a likelihood ratio. In essence, the likelihood ratio multiplies by V (where V is the value of the likelihood ratio) the
prior odds in favor of the proposition that the person of interest is the
source of the crime mark, rather than an unknown person. These are the odds
held by the decision-maker on the basis of the elements in the casebefore the scientific evidence is heard. It is clear at this inferential stage that the discussion focuses only on how
the scientific findings inform the decision-maker's probability for the
proposition that the person of interest, rather than an unknown person, is
the source of the crime scene mark. As seen on the far right-hand side in
Figure 3, this represents only one of the essential decision ingredients.
Other elements are needed in order to decide whether - or declare
that - the person of interest or an unknown person is the source of the
crime scene mark.
As we have seen, the decision-maker will also need to take into account how
adverse it is to wrongly associate the person of interest with the crime
scene mark, compared to wrongly excluding the person of interest as the
source of the crime scene mark. Contrary to the evaluation aspects of the
task, for which the scientist can indeed be of help to the decision-maker,
these latter elements of decision are of a very different nature, and
relate to the values attached to the consequences of the decision made in
that particular criminal case. The main insight here is that while
inference and decision are not the same, they are connected: inference is a
necessary preliminary for decision. In the context of a criminal case, this
means that the scientist can - at best - help with inference, but cannot be
in charge of the complete inference process,[27]
and even less so of the subsequent decision stage.[28]
Let us consider now the case of an expert who works in the identification paradigm. Such an expert will also assess the
probative weight of the observed similarities and differences between the
crime scene mark and the reference print provided by the suspect, though
this expert will use a somewhat different terminology. For example, if the
expert uses the U.S. Department of Justice approved uniform language, her
conclusions will be a direct statement of the probability that the person
of interest, rather than an unknown person, is the source of the crime
scene mark. Specifically, the expert will assert that «[a] source
identification is a statement of an examiner's belief (...) that the probability that the two impressions were made by
different sources is so small that it is negligible».[29]
The examiner thus considers it as certain that the person of interest is
the source of the crime scene mark, and has identified the person as the
source of the mark.[30]
We see two main problems with such an assertion.
First, it makes no sense to call a probability «negligible» in
and of itself, without acknowledging clearly what is at stake.
Consider, for example, the probability of eating a food to which you are
allergic when you order a dish in a restaurant. When ordering, you ask the
waiter whether the dish contains the ingredient to which you are allergic.
The waiter replies that there could be trace amounts of the food in the
dish, but that the probability is negligible. But isn't this something you should assess, considering the consequences of eating the food
in your particular case? If your allergy tends to give you tickles in the
back of the throat (irritating but not serious), what you consider to be a
negligible probability of encountering the target ingredient in your plate
will be very different from a situation in which eating the food in
question could cause you an anaphylactic shock (and potentially kill you).
At an extreme, imagine a case in which false identifications are considered
unacceptable decision consequences on principle - and hence are to be
avoided at all costs. In such a case, no positive probability for
an unknown person being the source of the crime stain is
«negligible» (i.e., acceptable). Hence, the use of the adjective
«negligible» shows that experts indeed, at least tacitly, make
judgments as to the values at play with the consequences of their
decisions. This, however, poses a problem in terms of transparency, because
experts will make value judgments for which they have not been mandated,
and for which they have no competence whatsoever.
The second problem is that the reporting format «source
identification» is very challenging to comprehend because the exact
contribution of the scientific findings (observed similarities and
differences) to the process of inference remains opaque. The two stages,
inference and decision, are combined in a way that makes it impossible for
the decision-maker to sort out what derives from science and can
legitimately be expected from the scientist, and what embodies broader
considerations for which the scientist holds no competence to give an
opinion.
As is apparent, experts operating in the identification paradigm
appropriate assessments that, following our discussion in Section III.1,
fall outside of their field of expertise. Notably, experts do not have
exhaustive information regarding the case. Thus, they are logically and
practically unable to combine their findings with the other elements in the
case; hence, there is no basis for them to determine whether the suspect is
indeed the source of the crime scene mark. Besides, it is not their role to
engage in decisional considerations that are of a legal nature (e.g.,
contemplating the question of how much doubt is allowed regarding the
proposition of common source), or constitute policy matters (e.g., the
question of how adverse a false identification is). In sum, an expert who
identifies the source of a crime scene mark appropriates rights and
competences that belong to the fact-finder. As noted by Stoney,
doing so renders forensic science practice unscientific.[31]
IV. Conclusions
In this contribution, we have made an attempt to capture, descriptively and
analytically, forensic identification in its most fundamental and,
hopefully, least controversial terms. This has led us, in essence, to see
that any person in charge of forensic identification faces the following
situation:
The decision to render an identification conclusion inevitably
entails one of several possible consequences; i.e., there is uncertainty
about decision consequences. For example, deciding to identify is
accompanied with the possibility of wrongly associating the person of
interest with the crime mark. The probability of this consequence depends
on how sure the decision-maker is, at the time of making the identification
decision, that the person of interest is indeed the source of the crime
scene mark.
One may say that this is not an original insight, but merely common-sense
understanding. While we agree with this observation, we have used this
intuitively tractable account only as a starting point to argue that formal analytical approaches to decision analysis, in particular decision
theory, are accessible concepts for all discussants involved in forensic
identification, and that full mathematical developments are not needed in
order to convey general decisional aspects of forensic identification
problems.
There are several key-points to be retained from our analysis. On the one
hand, all main elements of decision theory can be found in forensic
identification problems, in particular: decisions (e.g., the decision to
render a particular conclusion, such as «source identification»),
states of nature[32]
(i.e., whether the person of interest or an unknown person is the source of
the crime scene mark), decision consequences (e.g., a correct
identification, a false identification, etc.) and expressions of
(un-)desirability of decision consequences. But decision theory provides
much more: it also provides assistance in the coherent combination of the
various decision ingredients, and - most prominently - in how to compare
rival decisions. As we have seen, this comparison involves the
consideration of the various possible consequences of a decision, their
relative (un-)desirability, and the probability with which those
consequences may be incurred.
Taken together, these insights uncover what is fundamentally at stake with
traditional identification decisions, but has hitherto been left
unaddressed in broader circles of the field. Stoney concisely
noted:
«For over 100 years the courts and the public have expected, and
fingerprint examiners have provided, expert testimony that fuses these
three elements: offering testimony not as evidence, but as proof, assuming
priors and including decision making preferences. This created an
overwhelming and unrealistic burden, asking fingerprint examiners, in the
name of science, for something that science cannot provide. As a necessary
consequence, fingerprint examiners became unscientific.»[33]
Stoney
thus acknowledges that identification amounts to a decision that involves
value judgments, but advises that this goes beyond the scientist's area of
competence - anticipating thus the conclusions of our discussion (Section
III).
It is useful to clarify what exactly the formal decisional perspective to
forensic identification can do for us, and what it cannot do. A convenient
way to clarify some of the main considerations is a hypothetical
conversation in question and answer format, such as follows:
Q: «In a nutshell, what exactly does decision theory say?»
A: «In essence, decision theory focuses on the problem of how to
sensibly determine the course of action to be taken when the person in
charge of the decision may ‹gain› or ‹lose› through
decision consequences because the hypotheses about the present, past or
future state of the world are unknown to us to varying degrees.»
Q: «Can you be more precise, based on what elements do or should we
decide?»
A: «A short answer to this is: when using decision theory to analyse
your decision problem, you consider (1) what you think is probably the case
(i.e., how convinced you are that the person of interest is the source of
the crime scene mark), and (2) what you (don't) want in terms of values
(i.e., how you value the various possible decision consequences and compare
them against each other).»
Q: «Okay, but I already keep these things in mind, is there anything
more that decision theory can do for me?»
A: «Here is what decision theory provides as added values: First,
decision theory tells you that you do indeed focus on the pertinent
aspects. Second, decision theory provides you with instructions on how to
handle, in a logically sound way, both probability and preferences for
decision consequences.«
Q: «Okay, but what exactly are those instructions and how do I apply
them?»
A: «There is a mathematical dimension to decision theory that defines
precisely how probabilities and value judgments ought to be combined, and
rival decisions be compared.[34]
On a more general (i.e., non-numerical) account, and applied to the context
of forensic identification, decision-theoretic advice can also be given in
verbal terms, such as ‹the more is at stake, the more you shall be
sure before you decide›.»
Q: «This still does not tell me how exactly I should assess the
‹stakes›, how sure I should be and, finally, who ought to
decide.»
A: «You are exactly right: decision theory makes no prescription
whatsoever about how and by whom it is to be applied. It is a general
theory. It provides decision-makers, whoever they may be, with a framework
to help them better analyse and compare the advantages and possible
drawbacks of each decision.»
Q: «So, we cannot use decision theory directly in forensic
identification, and thus it is of limited practical relevance.»
A: «There is no suggestion of reducing forensic
identification to a purely decision-theoretic discourse, or even delegating
forensic identification to an abstract theory. Instead, decision theory
supports decision-makers in thinking in clear and structured ways about
their decision problem in the individual case and before
they decide. Beyond the application in individual cases, decision theory
helps us clarify the fundamental issues at play with forensic
identification, allowing all participants in the legal process to gain a
better awareness of the key factors and assessments. This is a contribution
towards more transparency.»
The latter paragraph brings the pending key challenges for forensic
practitioners and recipients of expert information to the point. Forensic
identifications are decisions that, in the end, still need to be
made by persons. Formal theories cannot relieve us from this burden. It is
up to the forensic and legal communities to use insight from formal
analyses wisely, especially for allocating decisional duties and defining
respective areas of competence of both forensic experts and legal
practitioners in a better-informed and more transparent way. In this sense,
we are of the opinion that forensic examiners should limit themselves to
opining on the probative value of the evidence, and refrain from opining on
the probability of the hypotheses at play in a given criminal case, as such
opinions always entail assumptions that lay in the competence of the
fact-finder.
[1]
In cases where database searches were conducted, it is sometimes
thought that an exhaustive comparison was done. This, however, is
not the case because databases are limited in size and do not
necessarily represent the relevant population (i.e., potential
suspects for the case at hand).
[2]
The only exception to this are so-called «closed-set
situations» in which there is a well-defined pool of potential
sources that can be investigated exhaustively.
[3]
A general example for the inversion fallacy is holding for equal
two statements such as «I have a dog, hence I have a furry
animal» and «I have a furry animal, hence I have a
dog»; or, more technically, conflating the probability of
finding the evidence if one assumes the truth of the hypothesis,
and the probability of the hypothesis being true if one observes
the evidence; See also Christophe Champod/Franco Taroni,
Probabilités au procès pénal - risques et solutions,
Revue Pénale Suisse 112(2) 1994, 194-219.
[4]
Although not competent to impose rules on Swiss practitioners, U.S.
forensic regulatory entities tend to influence practices in Europe
as well. The guidelines and regulations adopted by such entities
are also a reflection of practices in Europe and Switzerland as
European and Swiss experts participate in the drafting of such
documents.
[5]
U.S. Department of Justice,
Approved Uniform Language for Testimony and Reports for the
Forensic Latent Print Discipline, 24 September 2018. Despite these cautionary notes, the U.S.
Department of Justice recommends that scientists use expressions of
common source, which has recently attracted criticism; see notably
Simon A. Cole, A discouraging omen: a critical evaluation of the
approved uniform language for testimony and reports for the
forensic latent print discipline, Georgia State University Law
Review 34/2018 p. 1103 ss.
[6]
National Research Council, Strengthening forensic science in the
United States: a path forward, Washington D.C. 2009.
[7]
Without addressing the question of reporting formats, Swiss
fingerprint examiners have been mandated to undergo specialized
training and continuing education since the so-called
«Déclaration de Soleure» adopted in 2007 by the
heads of the forensic science units of the cantonal police forces.
This «declaration» mandates every operational fingerprint
examiner to be certified at one of three levels (depending on the
difficulty of the fingerprint comparisons carried out by that
person) and to renew their certification at regular intervals.
While abolishing the so-called 12-point standard, this
«declaration» does not prescribe particular reporting
formats for expressing the conclusions of fingerprint comparisons.
Currently, a majority of Swiss fingerprint examiners report their
conclusions in terms of «identification»,
«exclusion» or «inconclusive».
[8]
U.S. Department of Justice (fn. 5).
[9]
In later parts of this paper, we will discuss the question of
whether forensic examiners are the best-placed people in the legal
process to render identification conclusions.
[10]
Note that one may also assess how undesirable (i.e.,
adverse) decision consequences are. Throughout this text, we
consider both desirability and undesirability, though we may only
use one term at a time. While technically the two terms are
captured with two different but related concepts, i.e. utilities
and losses, respectively, the general level of discussion pursued
here does not require going into these details. Readers may
associate these considerations with Blackstone's famous 10:1 ratio
regarding the undesirability of falsely convicting one innocent
person compared against the «loss» incurred by freeing 10
culpable individuals. See William Blackstone, Commentaries on the
Laws of England, 1769, Vol. 4. Reprinted by: University of Chicago
Press, 1979. Note, however, that according to Kaye this ratio seems
to refer to an error rate (across multiple cases) rather
than an assessment of relative losses for a given case at hand. See
David H. Kaye, Clarifying the burden of persuasion: what Bayesian
decision rules do and do not do, The International Journal of
Evidence & Proof 3/1999, p. 1 ss.
[11]
Formally, a decision consequence is defined as the
combination of a decision and a state of nature. For example,
reporting an identification conclusion (decision) when the person
of interest truly is the source of the crime scene mark (state of
nature) will result in a correct identification (decision
consequence).
[12]
For example, when deciding whether to leave their home with an
umbrella in the morning, a rational agent will consider both the
probabilities of it raining that day, as well as the merit of, for
example, having an umbrella if it rains, the respective
inconvenience of not taking the umbrella and being rained on, or
taking the umbrella and having to carry it around all day although
it does not rain. See also, for instance, Franco Taroni/Silvia
Bozza/Colin Aitken, Decision Analysis in Forensic Science, Journal
of Forensic Sciences 50/2005, p. 894 ss.
[13]
Simon A. Cole, Individualization is dead, long live
individualization! Reforms of reporting practices for forensic
fingerprint analysis in the United States, Law, Probability and
Risk 13/2014, p. 117 ss.
[14]
It is possible to develop decision trees for more than two
decisions, but they may become more «bushy» (see, e.g.,
Franco Taroni/Alex Biedermann/Silvia Bozza/Paolo
Garbolino/Colin Aitken, Bayesian networks for Probabilistic
Inference and Decision Analysis in Forensic Science, 2nd
ed. Chichester 2014). For the purpose of clarity, only two
decisions are considered here. For general introductions to
decision trees see, for example, Howard Raiffa, Decision Analysis,
Introductory Lectures on Choices under Uncertainty, Reading,
Massachusetts 1968; Dennis V. Lindley, Making Decisions, 2nd ed., London 1985.
[16]
Hence the word «minimax» for the decision rule that
selects the option that minimises the maximum loss.
[17]
An analogy to this goes as follows: the probability of ending up
wet (i.e., adverse consequence) when not taking an umbrella when
leaving your home in the morning (i.e., your decision of
not taking an umbrella) depends on the probability of rain while
you are out during the day (i.e., the probability of the state of
nature «rain during the day»). So, your probability of
incurring the consequence of interest, getting wet, corresponds to
your probability of rain.
[19]
A well-known decision criterion in this context is the criterion
instructing decision-makers to select the decision that minimises
(maximises) expected loss (utility) (e.g., Lindley, fn. 14).
[20]
Note that such decision points answer the questions asked at the
beginning of this section.
[21]
For different numerical examples in the context of forensic
identification see, for example, Alex Biedermann/Silvia
Bozza/Franco Taroni, Analysing and exemplifying forensic conclusion
criteria in terms of Bayesian decision theory, Science &
Justice 58/2018, p. 159 ss. ; Alex Biedermann/ Silvia Bozza/Franco
Taroni, The decisionalization of individualization, Forensic
Science International 266/2016, p. 29 ss; Alex Biedermann/
Silvia Bozza/Franco Taroni, Decision theoretic properties of
forensic identification: underlying logic and argumentative
implications, Forensic Science International 177/2008, p.120 ss.
For accounts in legal contexts see, for example, Kaye, footnote 10,
and Richard D. Friedman, The Elements of Evidence, 4th
ed., St. Paul 2017.
[22]
We acknowledge at this point that our discussion is entirely
focused on the person of interest. The relative adversity of
erroneous determinations may also be looked at from the viewpoint
of examiners, their organisational units etc. (e.g., impact on
reputation, financial loss due to compensation allocated to wrongly
identified person).
[23]
Ronald J. Allen/Joe S. Miller, The common law theory of experts:
deference or education? Northwestern University Law Review 87/1993,
p. 1131 ss.
[24]
Alex Biedermann/Kyriakos N. Kotsoglou, Decisional dimensions in
expert witness testimony - A structural analysis, (in press): David R. Mandel et al. (Eds.)., Frontiers in
Psychology; Judgment and Decision Making Under Uncertainty:
Descriptive, Normative, and Prescriptive Perspectives.
[27]
Richard D. Friedman, Controlling the jury-teaching function, Seton
Hall Law Review 48/2018, p. 815 ss.
[28]
Specifically, in a likelihood ratio approach, the scientist would
convey that it is impossible to tell - from a scientific point of
view - what the probability is that the defendant is the source of
the crime scene mark. For example, in case of a likelihood ratio
greater than one, the scientist may give a statement along the
following lines: «I cannot tell you what the probability is
that the defendant left the fingermark because I do not have a
suitable prior probability for that proposition (i.e., before
considering the results of my analysis). This prior probability
depends on the strength of the other evidence for and against the
defendant, which is an assessment that lies beyond my area of
competence. All I can tell you is that, whatever your
probability is that the defendant rather than an unknown person is
the source of the crime mark, based on my analysis, this
probability is higher than it was before I did my analysis.»
[29]
U.S. Department of Justice (fn. 5).
[30]
William C. Thompson/Joëlle Vuille/Franco Taroni/Alex
Biedermann, After uniqueness: the evolution of forensic science
opinions, Judicature 102/2018, p. 18 ss.
[31]
David A. Stoney, Discussion on the paper by Neumann, Evett and
Skerrett, Journal of the Royal Statistical Society: Series A
(Statistics in Society) 175/2012, p. 399 s. Some writers have gone
so far as to recommend that «(...) experts should abandon the
identification/individualization conclusion altogether»
Christophe Champod/Chris Lennard/Pierre Margot/Milutin Stoilovic,
Fingerprints and other Ridge Skin Impressions, 2nd ed.,
Boca Raton 2016 (at 96).
[32]
Associated to states of nature are probabilities, expressing one's
uncertainty regarding which state of nature actually holds.
[33]
Stoney (fn. 31), p. 400.
[34]
As noted earlier in Sect. II.4, the mathematics of decision
analysis are beyond the scope of this paper.